Michael L. Hendry, Douglas Bassett, and Five  T  Corporation v. Unidyn Financial Management Corporation Douglas Longfellow, G. Lawrence Critchfield, Paul Christensen, Wespac Holdings, L.L.C., Ken Morgan, Western Real Estate Investment Trust, Inc., and Does 1-10 : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Michael L. Hendry, Douglas Bassett, and Five "T"
Corporation v. Unidyn Financial Management
Corporation Douglas Longfellow, G. Lawrence
Critchfield, Paul Christensen, Wespac Holdings,
L.L.C., Ken Morgan, Western Real Estate
Investment Trust, Inc., and Does 1-10 : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Timothy W. Blackburn; Van Cott, Bagley, et al.; Attorneys for Appellees.
Steve S. Christensen; Hirschi & Christensen; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Hendry v. Unidyn Financial, No. 20040772 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5204
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL L. HENDRY, DOUGLAS 
BASSETT, AND FIVE "T" 
CORPORATION, 
Appellees/Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIDYN FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 
DOUGLAS LONGFELLOW, G. 
LAWRENCE CRITCHFIELD, PAUL 
CHRISTENSEN, WESPAC 
HOLDINGS, L.L.C., KEN MORGAN, 
WESTERN REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT TRUST, INC., and 
DOES 1-10, 
Appellants/Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SLAT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The Honorable Roger S. Dutson, District Judge 
Steve S. Christensen, (U.S.B. No. 6156) Timothy W. Blackburn (U.S.B. No. 0355) 
HlRSCHl CHIRSTENSEN, PLLC Van Cott, Bagley et al. 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 2404 Washington Blvd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3156 Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 (801) 394-5783 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 (801) 627-2522 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
Appellate Case No. 20040772-CA 
Civil No. 990906932 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
Oral Argument Requested 
Priority 15 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL L. HENDRY, DOUGLAS 
BASSETT, AND FIVE "T" 
CORPORATION, 
Appellees/Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIDYN FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 
DOUGLAS LONGFELLOW, G. 
LAWRENCE CRITCHFIELD, PAUL 
CHRISTENSEN, WESPAC 
HOLDINGS, L.L.C., KEN MORGAN, 
WESTERN REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT TRUST, INC., and 
DOES 1-10, 
Appellants/Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SLAT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The Honorable Roger S. Dutson, District Judge 
Steve S. Christensen, (U.S.B. No. 6156) Timothy W. Blackburn (U.S.B. No. 0355) 
HIRSCHI CHIRSTENSEN, PLLC Van Cott, Bagley et al. 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 2404 Washington Blvd. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3156 Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 (801) 394-5783 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 (801) 627-2522 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
Appellate Case No. 20040772-CA 
Civil No. 990906932 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
Oral Argument Requested 
Priority 15 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Authorities Page 
U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment 1, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 5(b)( 1) 5 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b) 1,3,4,17 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)( 1) 4,11,19 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(3) 4.15,19 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6) 4 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 4-506 9 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(1) 6 
Cases 
Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders. Inc.. 882 P.2d 1147,1148 (Utah 1994) 1-2 
Fisher v.Bvbee. 2004 UT 92,104 P.3d 1198 8 
Franklin Coverv Client Sales. Inc. V. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110. Par. 9. 2 P. 3d 451 4 
Hernandez v. Baker. 104 P.3d 664, 514 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 2004 UT App 462 (2004) 2, 17, 18 
In re Adoption of B.T.D.. 68 P. 3d 1021,470 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 
2003 UT App 99, **40 (Ut. App. 2003) 18 
Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 68 P.3d 1008, 467 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 2003 
UT App 46 (Ut App. 2003) 4 
Smithv. Sperrv. 694 P.2d 581 (1984^ 9,10 
State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053,1055-56 
(Utah 1983) 2 
Valley Leasing v. Houghton. 661 P.2d 959, 960 (Utah 1983) 16-17 
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 
ARGUMENT 1 
ISSUE ONE: Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), the Court erred when it failed to set 
aside the judgment in this case which was rendered after the court mistakenly 
assumed that Mr. Critchfield's attorney had withdrawn when this mistaken 
assumption resulted in a lack of notice to Mr. Critchfield of trial. 4 
ISSUE Two: Even if the appellate court does not find a mistake justifying relief, the 
failure of notice in this case which was not cured by Mr. Critchfield's reasonable 
efforts to ascertain the status of the proceeding do show excusable neglect by Mr. 
Critchfield in this case. 11 
ISSUE THREE: The trial court committed error when it gave no explanation as 
to the reasons or the basis for its decision denying the Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment. 17 
ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 19 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL L. HENDRY, DOUGLAS 
BASSETT, AND FIVE "T" 
CORPORATION, 
Appellees/Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIDYN FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 
DOUGLAS LONGFELLOW, G. 
LAWRENCE CRITCHFIELD, PAUL 
CHRISTENSEN, WESPAC 
HOLDINGS, L.L.C., KEN MORGAN, 
WESTERN REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT TRUST, INC., and 
DOES 1-10, 
Appellants/Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appellate Case No. 20040772-CA 
Civil No. 990906932 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
ARGUMENT 
This appeal is brought pursuant to the due process clause of the fifth amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution and rules of fundamental justice and fair play. A court may 
"relieve a party ... from a final judgment" because of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). To obtain relief from a default judgment, a defendant 
must show: (i) "that the judgment was entered against him through excusable neglect (or any 
other reason specified in rule 60(b))," (ii) "that his motion to set aside the judgment was timely," 
and (iii) "that he has a meritorious defense to the action." Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders. 
1 
Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994) (citing State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. 
Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983) (plurality opinion)). Hernandez v. Baker. 104 
P.3d 664, 514 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 2004 UT App 462 (2004). 
Mr. Critchfield has demonstrated in his Motion to Set Aside Judgment that there 
was a factual mistake by the court and counsel in this action which gave rise to excusable 
neglect by Mr. Critchfield since he was not informed about the trial date even after he 
made inquiry. See Motion to Set Aside Default, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, 
Affidavit of Lawrence Critchfield at par. 12 and Affidavit of Alan Mecham, R. at 760-
809 (Counsel notes for the court that Mr. Mecham's Affidavit does not appear on the 
Index provided by the court of appeals, however it is reflected as filed in the District 
Court file on February 3, 2004). 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, represented by VanCott Bagley, et al., filed a complaint on 
October 8, 1999 in the trial court below. Mr. Critchfield, appellant, was represented 
throughout the litigation by Wesley Sine. Another defendant, WESPAC Holdings, LLC, 
was represented at trial by Parsons, Behle & Latimer but does not participate in this 
appeal. After this case had been litigated for 3-1/2 years, a request was made for a 
pretrial conference. The court scheduled the telephonic conference a month later on May 
13, 2003. (Notice of this pretrial conference is not in the record; Appellant will make a 
motion to the court to add this to his Addenda as D). However, Mr. Critchfield was 
neither told that the conference had been requested nor that during the telephone 
conference, the court had scheduled a trial date. See Affidavit of Lawrence Critchfield at 
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par. 8-11, R. At 777-809. On June 17, 2003 a Notice to Appear and Appoint was filed 
and served on Mr. Critchfield. 
On June 19, 2003 a Motion to Allow Withdrawal of Counsel was filed by Wesley 
Sine. This motion was served on both Van Cott, Bagley, et al., and Parsons, Behle & 
Latimer. However, Mr. Critchfield did not receive a copy of the motion. None of the 
parties filed any responsive pleadings to the Motion to Allow Withdrawal of Counsel. 
None of the parties filed a Notice to Submit the Motion to Allow Withdrawal of Counsel 
for decision. The court failed to rule on the Motion to Allow Withdrawal of Counsel, but 
mistakenly assumed at trial that Mr. Sine had withdrawn. This mistake resulted in a 
complete lack of notice to Mr. Critchfield of the trial setting, even after through his 
business attorney, he inquired of counsel for both parties on July 7, 2003. See Affidavit 
of Alan Mecham attached as Appellant's Addendum A. At trial the court entered 
judgment for over $400,000.00 on a corporate obligation against Mr. Critchfield 
personally, including attorneys fees and punitive damages. (See the February 1, 2005 
Notice of Filing Pleadings for the Docketing Statement Exhibit A; This judgment is not 
attached to the record on appeal; Appellant will seek by motion to add this document as 
Appellant's Addenda E). 
In the unusual instance where all of the safeguards of notice fail, as was the case in 
this matter, Mr. Critchfield should be entitled to relief under rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. This section provides for relief from a judgment taken by mistake, 
inadvertence, misrepresentation of counsel (whether negligent or intentional) or for any 
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other reasons that would make the judgment unjust. This appeal is brought because no 
notice of the trial was given to Mr. Critchfield by the court or by its officers and because 
the court thereafter abused its discretion by refusing to grant relief from an extremely 
large judgment against Mr. Critchfield pursuant to Mr. Critchfield's timely Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(1), (3) and (6) (2004). 
In Appellees Brief, Appellees neither allege that the Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
was not timely nor that Mr. Critchfield had a meritorious defense in the action. 
ISSUE ONE: Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), the Court erred when it failed to set 
aside the judgment in this case which was rendered after the court mistakenly 
assumed that Mr. Critchfield's attorney had withdrawn when this mistaken 
assumption resulted in a lack of notice to Mr. Critchfield of trial. 
Generally the standard of review of a Rule 60(b) motion is under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Franklin Coverv Client Sales, Inc. V. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110, 
Par. 9,2 P. 3d 451. However, as the court found in Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 68 
P.3d 1008, 467 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 2003 UT App 46 (Ut App. 2003), there are "situations 
where 'the result [under rule 60(b)] is foreordained and it would be an abuse of discretion 
. . . to deny relief." Id. (Citation omitted). In the present case, Mr. Critchfield asserts that 
the lack of notice of trial to him due to confusion of the court and counsel as to the 
procedural standing of the case gives rise to such a case where it would be an abuse of 
discretion to deny him relief. 
Mr. Critchfield has lived at the same address throughout the proceeding. He was 
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served at that address initially. All of the parties had Mr. Critchfield's address, at least as 
of June 17, 2003, as indicated by the service of the Notice to Appear and Appoint. 
Attached as Appellee's Addendum D. After June 20, 2003, the attorneys assumed that 
Mr. Sine had withdrawn as counsel; perhaps including, as Appellee argues, Mr. Sine. Mr. 
Sine had submitted his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel with an Order. It appears that Mr. 
Sine was not sent any ruling denying his motion. It is likely that he would assume the 
motion is granted in the absence of a denial. However, Mr. Sine's improper withdrawal 
and the lack of notice of the scheduled trial to Mr. Critchfield severely prejudiced Mr. 
Critchfield. 
The only pleadings filed between June 20, 2003 and October 1, 2003 were sent by 
both adverse attorneys in the matter to Mr. Critchfield directly but not to Mr. Sine as 
would be required by Rule 5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the 
clerk's office did not make this same assumption. The clerk's office sent a request for 
trial briefs on July 1, 2003. This correspondence was directed to Mr. Sine, not Mr. 
Critchfield. The result was that Mr. Critchfield received no service of his attorney's 
notice of withdrawal, no notice of the trial from his attorney and no correspondence 
regarding the trial from the court. The mailings to him from counsel came just a few days 
before trial when Mr. Critchfield was out of town. 
In the event that an attorney, such as Mr. Sine in this case should fail to notify his 
client of a pretrial conference or a trial setting before withdrawing as counsel, clients are 
provided procedural safeguards set up by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to make sure 
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that they receive notice of trial dates. 
First, rule 4-506 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, the predecessor of Rule 
74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires an attorney who seeks to withdraw to 
give notice of any pending trial dates. 
Second, any withdrawal of counsel after a certificate of readiness has been filed, 
which presumably includes a request for a pretrial conference as was the case herein, 
must be done pursuant to noticed motion and court permission. 
Third, the officers of the court in this matter had some responsibility under Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(1) Candor toward the Tribunal to inform the 
court of the following: First the proposed Notice of Withdrawal of Mr. Sine which neither 
contained a certificate of mailing to his specific address, nor an explicit notice of the trial 
date; second, the lack of any ruling on the Motion to Allow Withdrawal of Counsel; third, 
that on July 7, 2003, Alan Mecham, esq., had spoken with both the secretary for Mara 
Brown at Van Cott, Bagley, et al. and Derek Langton of Parsons, Behle & Latimer on 
behalf of Mr. Critchfield to ascertain the status of the litigation and that neither firm had 
either disclosed any information about a trial date or made any attempt to follow up with 
Mr. Critchfield or Mr. Mecham; fourth that both counsel had wrongly assumed that the 
Motion to Withdraw was granted and had failed to serve a copy of the subpoena notice or 
trial brief to Mr. Sine; and fifth and finally, that neither counsel as a matter of 
professional courtesy (which should be of such importance, especially with pro se 
litigants, to the smooth operation of the courts, to the image of the legal profession and to 
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the responsibility of the legal system to administer laws fairly) had forwarded to Mr. 
Critchfield a courtesy copy of the court's letter to counsel dated July 1, 2003, fourteen 
days after the Notice to Appear and Appoint. 
Mr. Critchfield does not raise these points to argue that counsel have violated the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. Rather, Mr. Critchfield strongly argues that the system of 
justice failed to give him notice of a trial date in this case despite numerous procedural 
safeguards. This failure was due to the oversights of counsel to give the court notice of 
the above cited failings. The failure was also due to the apparent oversight of the court in 
assuming it had granted a Motion to Withdraw when it had not. This oversight resulted in 
the lack of notice of the trial to Mr. Critchfield which, absent the court's error, would at 
least have come through the court's request for trial briefs on July 1, 2003. It appears that 
even though the court is not sending notices to Mr. Critchfield, the court presumes that 
Mr. Critchfield was given notice of the trial. Therefore, the court proceeded with trial in 
the absence of Mr. Critchfield to his substantial detriment. 
The factual mistake of the court as towhether Mr. Critchfield's attorney had 
withdrawn, placed Mr. Critchfield in a void. On the one hand the court appears to assume 
that Mr. Critchfield's attorney successfully withdrew on or about June 16, 2003 and that 
appropriate notice to appear counsel was given. On the other hand, because the Motion to 
Withdraw as Counsel was still pending, the clerk's office of the court continued to send 
correspondence to Mr. Critchfield's attorney, Mr. Sine, who had filed the Notice of 
Withdrawal. See Appellee's Addendum C. If Mr. Critchfield is going to be held 
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responsible for representing himself before the court, he should also be entitled to copies of 
the correspondence from the court in the action. 
Appellee argues that Mr. Critchfield's case has asserted a mistake of law. However, 
Mr. Critchfield argues that the Court's mistake at trial which gave rise to the Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment was a mistake of fact. This mistake is documented in the trial minutes on 
October 1, 2003 at the outset of trial. See the Docket for this date attached as Appellant's 
Addendum A. On page 10 of the Appellees brief footnote 1, Appelleexlaims that Mr. 
Critchfield "characterizes the first issue as a question of law, reviewed for correctness, 
involving the Court's interpretation of the statute, rule or ordinance". Any mistake of law 
being alleged in this appeal by Critchfield was made in the court's ruling on the Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment. The citations to the court on the issue of mistake by the Appellee relate 
to mistakes of law at trial and are not relevant to the issue before the Court. Rule 60(b)(1) 
contemplates the availability of relief when factual mistakes are made, as in this case. 
The factual mistake in this case was not harmless. Rather the mistake went to the 
heart of due process. As a result of the mistake, the court's request for a trial brief went to 
Mr. Sine instead of Mr. Critchfield. The court was not informed that Mr. Critchfield had not 
received the Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel. Mr. Critchfield had no notice of trial. 
Mr. Critchfield did not assert in his brief that the court had made a mistake in 
interpreting Rule 4-506 of The Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. If so, the Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment would have been a Rule 59 motion. The case of Fisher v. Bvbee, 2004 
UT 92,104 P.3d 1198, involved a mistake of law on the trial court level and is not relevant 
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to the argument raised by the Mr. Critchfield on appeal. Rather, Mr. Critchfield asserts that 
the Court properly understood Rule 4-506 but mistakenly believed that Mr. Sine's Motion 
to Withdraw had been ruled on. 
Appellee.next argues that the Court's decision in Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (UT 
1984) is distinguishable from the present case. In Sperry, the Court reversed the trial court's 
decision denying a Motion to Vacate Judgment. However, Sperry is very factually similar 
to this case. Both this case and Sperry regard clients who did not receive adequate notice of 
proceedings because of noncompliance with Rule 4-506. In Sperry, the attorney withdrew 
properly but the adverse party failed to file and serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint. The 
appellate court held that the Sperry court had not followed its own rules and had given no 
explanation justifying the failure. Id. Similarly, the court in this case, due to its own 
mistaken assumption, either failed to direct its correspondence to Mr. Critchfield after the 
filing of a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel or a Notice to Appear and Appoint had been 
filed (The court's letter is not in the Index of the Record; Appellant will submit a motion to 
add the letter to the record or to supplement its Addenda to include this letter as Addendum 
F) or the court failed to recognize at trial that Mr. Sine's Motion was still pending, had not 
been ruled on and that there was confusion as to the status of representation of Mr. 
Critchfield as indicated by the failure of counsel to provide a copy of their trial briefs and 
trial subpoenas to Mr. Sine. Either way, Mr. Critchfield did not get notice of the trial because 
of the court's mistaken assumed that it had ruled on the Motion to Allow Withdrawal of 
Counsel. 
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On the other hand, Appellee cites the court to Sperrv at page 582 for the proposition 
that the Court found that the defense attorney named McCallister "substantially complied" 
with the rule for withdrawal as attorney. However, there is a significant difference between 
the withdrawal of attorney in this case and that of Sperrv. This case involves a Motion for 
Withdrawal as attorney by Mr. Sine after trial had been requested by counsel and set by the 
court. Whereas, in Sperrv only a Notice of Withdrawal was required. Further, in Sperrv, 
McCalister had mailed a copy of his Notice of Withdrawal to counsel and sent a letter 
notifying his client of his withdrawal. Therefore everyone was on notice. In this case, even 
if Appellee's argument that Mr. Critchfield was anticipating a withdrawal were accepted, the 
court clerk was not on notice of the withdrawal and did not send the trial correspondence to 
Mr. Critchfield. This disconnect failed to give Mr. Critchfield notice of trial. 
Mr. Critchfield had participated fully as a Defendant in this action for over three 
years. He had answered the complaint and had counsel present at every step of the 
proceeding until after the trial date was set. The only hearing Mr. Critchfield missed was 
trial itself. The only reason Mr. Critchfield was not present was due to the failure of notice. 
Therefore it would be fair and equitable for the court to set aside the judgment against Mr. 
Critchfield and permit him to defend himself at a fair trial on the merits. 
Appellee's suggest that the Appellant Court should assume that the Trial Court 
granted permission to withdraw on the day of trial because Judge Dutson was aware that 
Wesley Sine had been present at the trial setting conference and that he was not present at 
the time of trial. Appellee states "the Court was also aware that counsel had withdrawn after 
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a trial had been scheduled". See page 13-14 of Appellee's Brief. However, this statement 
is incorrect. The Court assumed that counsel had withdrawn and moved on with trial under 
that mistaken assumption. In fact counsel had not withdrawn and the Court had not ruled on 
the Motion to Allow Withdrawal of Attorney. Therefore, the Notice to Appear or Appoint 
was premature because it gave notice of an event that had not occurred. Therefore it only 
created confusion-the court clerk believing there was no withdrawal and the attorneys 
believing the withdrawal had occurred. 
Because the failure of compliance with the court rules cause a failure of notice to Mr. 
Critchfield of the trial in this case, the error caused by a factual mistake of counsel and the 
court was not harmless. Therefore relief should be granted to Mr. Critchfield under Rule 60 
(b)(1). 
ISSUE TWO: Even if the appellate court does not find a mistake justifying relief, 
the failure of notice in this case which was not cured by Mr. Critchfield's reasonable 
efforts to ascertain the status of the proceeding do show excusable neglect by Mr. 
Critchfield in this case. 
Appellee argues that any ambiguity in the proceedings could have been resolved by 
additional effort on Mr. Critchfields part. However, Mr. Critchfield did make reasonable 
effort. 
Mr. Critchfield exercised reasonable diligence. First, after receipt of the Notice to 
Appear and Appoint, Mr. Critchfield asked his business attorney, Alan Mecham to inquire 
into the status of the matter. See Affidavit of Alan Mecham at Appellant's Addendum B. 
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Mr. Mecham called Mr. Langton, the attorney who sent the Notice ot Appear or Appoint, and 
asked him the status of the pending litigation. Mr. Mecham was told that the deposition had 
not been reset. See Appellant's Addendum B. Mr. Mecham was not given any further 
information by the attorney, including there was no mention that a trial had been set. See 
Appellant's Addendum B. From Mr. Mecham's report, Mr. Critchfield would believe that 
the only pending matter before the Court was a deposition date that had not been noticed. 
Mr. Critchfield had reasonably attempted to follow up with this matter and was given no 
direction or assistance by the attorney who was seeking the deposition and no information 
from Appellee's attorney's office. 
Mr. Critchfield heard nothing on the case until the end of September, 2003. Appellee 
seems to argue that the mere passage of time should have cured the mistake in this case. At 
page 14 of Appellee's Brief, Appellee argues that because three and a half months passed any 
failure of the Court was a technicality. If this were a case of numerous documents were 
being filed and served on Mr. Critchfield which suggested an approaching trial, this 
argument may have had more strength. 
However, it was commonplace in this case for there to be no activity for periods 
longer than 2-1/2 months. This case was litigated for 3-1/2 years prior to trial being set. 
Between the dates of 10/3/01 and 1/17/03, the only pleadings filed in the case were on 
2/1/02,2/20/02 and 5/14/02. See Index of the Record. This case had been nearly stagnant 
for the year and a half before Mr. Critchfield's attorney was asked to withdraw. In this case, 
the Court had had no filing for over three months after the Withdrawal of Counsel on June 
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20, 2003. The only filings were immediately before trial and included a Subpoena, which 
did not specify it was for a trial, and a Trial Brief for an unspecified date. The lack of 
activity of this case gave no effective notice to Mr. Critchfield that a trial was near. 
Second, upon notice from his wife that a trial brief had come in the mail, Mr. 
Critchfield asked his friend Richard Christensen to check into the status of this case. Mr. 
Christensen found that the case had been tried in the absence of Mr. Critchfield earlier the 
same day. See Affidavit of Lawrence Critchfield at par. 8-11, R. At 777-809. 
The response of counsel to Mr. Mecham's inquiry was only misleading. Had counsel 
pointed out the failure of the clerk to copy Mr. Critchfield on the request for briefing or just 
mentioned that the case was set for trial in 90 days, Mr. Critchfield would have had some 
notice of trial. Counsel could have given a courtesy copy of the trial notice to Mr. Critchfield 
when they saw no notice in the Notice of Withdrawal or if they had just mentioned the 
upcoming trial date. The attorneys were the ones who knew a trial was coming. They also 
could see from the papers that there was no notice to Mr. Critchfield as required by the rules. 
It is note worthy that there was not one effort made by Appellees in this case to give 
Mr. Critchfield any notice of the pending trial or to make sure that the Court ruled on the 
motion for Withdrawal of Counsel or that there was a corrected Notice of Withdrawal of 
Counsel indicating the trial date. There was not even an informal letter to Mr. Critchfield 
from Appellees in this case to give him notice of the trial date. Mr. Critchfield could 
reasonably expect that if a trial were pending the adverse attorney would let him know, 
especially when Mr. Mecham called to ascertain the status of the proceedings. Mr. 
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Critchfields efforts in this matter are not disputed. It was reasonable for Mr. Critchfield to 
assume that if his business attorney called and inquired as to the status of the matter, that he 
would be given a full disclosure rather than a partial disclosure which occurred in this case. 
In the Statement of Fact, Appellee suggests that Mr. Critchfield had not cooperated 
with having his deposition taken. However, Appellee fully deposed Mr. Critchfield on May 
4,2001, two years before there was a trial set in this matter. On page 123 of the deposition 
at pages 11 and 12, Mr. Blackburn states "That's all the questions I have." (This deposition 
is not in the record, but Appellant will move the court to allow Appellant to supplement the 
record and add it as Addendum G). The deposition of Mr. Critchfield was to be continued 
so that Mr. Langton could ask questions. However, this was the deposition Mr. Critchfield 
inquired about on July 7, 2003 and was told it had not been set. Therefore it appears that 
counsel elected not to go forward with it. Mr. Langton's client is not participating in this 
appeal. Therefore there can be no claim that the deposition of Mr. Critchfield prejudiced the 
Appellees in any way. 
In footnote 2 of the bottom of page 13 of Appellee's Brief, Appellee argues that 
Wesley Sine's proof of service indicates the name of G. Lawrence Critchfield. However, 
the Proof of Service indicates no address to which such a notice was delivered and Mr. 
Critchfield received no Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel or a Motion to Withdraw as 
Counsel from Mr. Sine. See Affidavit of Lawrence Critchfield, par. 5, R. 777-809. There 
was no suggestion to Mr. Critchfield that a trial was approaching. 
Appellee rests its entire argument of Notice of Trial on a Subpoena that was sent to 
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Mr. Critchfield by Appellee and a Trial Brief sent by another party. However, these 
documents were sent only one week before the trial date when Mr. Critchfield was not in 
town. There is no basis to put blame on Mr. Critchfield for not checking his mail when he 
was not in town, especially when he was not anticipating any significant notices to come. 
Appellee's claim that there was sufficient notice of trial to Mr. Critchfield the day 
before trial when he was out of town is unsupported by the law. As demonstrated by the 
facts in case, Mr. Critchfield was not able to respond to the mailing soon enough to find out 
that the trail was scheduled the very day he asked Richard Christensen to check on the status 
of the matter. The factual mistake of the court could have been corrected had counsel 
brought it to the attention of the Court that the Motion to Withdraw had never been ruled 
upon. Absent the information of counsel to Mr. Critchfield or the court, Mr. Critchfield's 
failure to appear at trial should be deemed excusable. 
In the alternative, the failure of counsel to bring the pending motion to the Courts 
attention amounted to misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party which 
would also afford relief under Rule 60(b)(3). 
Admittedly, the attorneys knew how to reach Critchfield. There was no need to give 
a Notice of Change of Address to the court. Mr. Critchfield did not change addresses. The 
failure of notice of the trial being sent to Mr. Critchfield was due to the confusion of the 
court and the court file which was an issue beyond Mr. Critchfield's control. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion by denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgement 
when the basic tenants of due process were not met in this case due to a factual mistake by 
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the trial court and similar mistakes by both adverse parties by failing to give notice to Mr. 
Critchfield that a trial was approaching. 
The Appellee argues that the failure was the failure of Mr. Sine. However, had Mr. 
Sine's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel come before the Court, the Court itself would have 
sent notice to Mr. Critchfield that his attorney had withdrawn and trial was approaching. Mr. 
Sine's failure was in his failure to file a Notice to Submit his Motion to Allow Withdrawal 
of counsel. However, any party can submit another parties' motion for decision. Therefore, 
any error in the failure to submit the Motion to Allow Withdrawal of Counsel must be shared 
by all counsel. The failure of the court to rule on the withdrawal is significant primarily 
because it prevented proper notice of the trial to Mr. Critchfield. 
After reasonable inquiry of both adverse attorneys, Mr. Critchfield was given no 
notice of trial in this case. In this case Mr. Critchfield used due diligence to ascertain the 
status of the lawsuit filed against him by Plaintiff. Had Mr. Critchfield known that a trial 
was pending he would have used more diligence to obtain a new attorney. However, when 
the case appeared to be stagnant it was reasonable for Mr. Critchfield to be less diligent in 
obtaining counsel. This is especially true since in reality Mr. Sine had not yet withdrawn. 
Due diligence does not require a Defendant to prosecute an action. The real failure in this 
case was the failure of any notice to Mr. Critchfield from the Appellees. The Appellees were 
in the best position to see the defects in the notices. Appellees had the responsibility to 
prosecute this action. 
This case is distinguishable from Valley Leasing v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959, 960 
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(Utah 1983). In that case the party clearly had notice because he sent his wife. In this case, 
Mr. Critchfield did not even know about trial until it had already passed. Mr. Critchfield was 
not absent because trial was inconvenient in this case, he was absent due to a failure of 
notice. 
Critchfield, especially after participating in this litigation for several years, is entitled 
to notice under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when the court sets a trial of the matter. 
When he exercised due diligence, he is entitled to full disclosure from counsel. Failure to 
give disclosure is a legitimate basis for a finding of excusable neglect by Mr. Critchfield. 
This court should reverse the trial court's denial of the Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 
ISSUE THREE: The trial court committed error when it gave no explanation as to 
the reasons or the basis for its decision denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 
Appellee does not dispute in its reply brief that, if the judgment were set aside, Mr. 
Critchfield would have a meritorious defense in the trial court action. Appellee's assertions 
under Appellant's issue three go only to the question of whether the adequacy of the trial 
court's factual findings were preserved for appeal. 
On this point it appears that Appellee is confused by Appellant's brief. Appellant 
apologizes if the issue was not clear. However, the assertions under issue three are intended 
to address the failure of the trial court in its ruling on the Motion to Set Aside Judgment, not 
the findings of fact at trial. In the 2004 case of Hernandez v. Baker, 104 P.3d 664, 514 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 23, 2004 UT App 462 (2004), the court of appeals held that a motion to set aside 
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) must show three factors: excusable neglect, a timely filing 
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and a meritorious defense. Id. In Hernandez, the court address the meritorious defense but 
was silent on the first two issues. Id. The court of appeals vacated and remanded that case 
in part because the trial court had failed to rule on each element of the motion specifically. 
Id. 
Mr. Critchfield argues in his Issue Three that the court's order on Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment lacks specificity. It states only that on the basis of "the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law herein" [referring to findings and conclusions at trial], the motion is 
hereby denied. It is undisputed that the Motion to Set Aside Judgment was timely and that 
Mr. Critchfield has asserted a meritorious defense. Therefore the denial should not be for 
those reasons. However, the court does not state whether the motion is being denied because 
there was no mistake, no excusable neglect, no lack of disclosure by the attorneys or no 
demonstration that the judgment against Mr. Critchfield personally is unjust. 
Because the appellate court has no guidance as to the basis for the denial in this case, 
it is difficult for the appellate court to know even what standard of review to apply. The 
appellate court has applied the abuse of discretion standard of review of some determinations 
of excusable neglect while determination of a meritorious defense has been reviewed under 
acorrectness standard. In In re Adoption of B.T.D., 68 P. 3d 1021,470 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 
2003 UT App 99, * *40 (Ut. App. 2003), the court held, referring to a Rule 60(b) motion that 
our "the standard of review we apply may differ depending on the type of motion. JdL 
The assertions in the Appellant's primary brief under Issue Three further show that 
Mr. Critchfield did have a viable defense before the trial court. Mr. Critchfield acted as an 
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officer of a corporation in all matters alleged below. See Affidavit of Lawrence Critchfield 
at par. 2-5, R. 925-944. He should not have been subject to a personal judgment. Further, 
Mr. Critchfield at all times expected the corporate parties responsible for the loan from 
Plaintiffs to pay that loan. See Affidavit of Lawrence Critchfield at par. 12-24, R. 925-944. 
Mr. Critchfield did not agree to personally guarantee any debts. See Affidavit of Lawrence 
Critchfield at par. 27,33-34, R. 925-944. Further, Mr. Critchfield's expectation of aNevada 
property to secure the loan of Plaintiffs fell through for reasons beyond his control. See 
Affidavit of Lawrence Critchfield at par. 32, R. 925-944. The appellate court should reverse 
and set aside the trial court's judgment. 
ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 
This court is to decide whether there was a mistake which would justify relief under 
Rule 60(b)(1) when no notice of the trial was sent to Mr. Critchfield after a Notice to Appear 
and Appoint was filed prematurely and the Notice of Withdrawal was defective to give notice 
of the trial and neither the court nor opposing counsel recognized the defect. 
In the alternative, whether there was excusable neglect which would justify relief under Rule 
60(b)(1) and (3) when Mr. Critchfield did not receive notice of the trial even after he made 
contact with both counsel in the matter following receipt of a Notice to Appear and Appoint; 
when Mr. Critchfield was led to believe by opposing counsel that he would receive 
correspondence regarding his deposition and he was justifiably surprised by the court's action 
when it entered a substantial judgment against Mr. Critchfield personally without notice to 
him of a trial. 
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Finally, whether the failure of the court to set out in its opinion the basis of its ruling 
is reversible error. 
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